Beeching report

[cambois]

This is a debate that could run and run. There is no doubt thst the railway in the 60s was too big and trying to do a lot that it was not suited to. But I suggest that an analysis of the closure 1967 0nwards - roughly 1000 miles was probably wrong as these included a lot of the more strategic routes which would be on considerable value now, and would have been developed in the mid/late 80s with the Provincial revival.

Which is why my real anger is with Labour - Barbara Castle, Harold Wilson et al, who really did nothing to stop the rot.

Then history repeated itself with Blair!!

There is a message here

That said it is easy to be wise after the event.

[PinzaC55]

This is a debate that could run and run. There is no doubt thst the railway in the 60s was too big and trying to do a lot that it was not suited to. But I suggest that an analysis of the closure 1967 0nwards - roughly 1000 miles was probably wrong as these included a lot of the more strategic routes which would be on considerable value now, and would have been developed in the mid/late 80s with the Provincial revival.

Which is why my real anger is with Labour - Barbara Castle, Harold Wilson et al, who really did nothing to stop the rot.

Then history repeated itself with Blair!!

There is a message here

That said it is easy to be wise after the event.

Or that those who do not learn from history are condemned to repeat it.

[strang steel]

This is a debate that could run and run. There is no doubt thst the railway in the 60s was too big and trying to do a lot that it was not suited to. But I suggest that an analysis of the closure 1967 0nwards - roughly 1000 miles was probably wrong as these included a lot of the more strategic routes which would be on considerable value now, and would have been developed in the mid/late 80s with the Provincial revival.

.

Oxford to Cambridge being the real mystery.

The reversal at Bedford may have been a contributory factor, but with dmus that is not a problem. Which leaves only the cost of a revised layout at Sandy as a prohibitive expense which contributed to its demise.

There seems to have been no thought given to future population distribution; even though at the time of that particular closure, plans for a vast urban area called Milton Keynes must have been well advanced.

[sandwhich]

Cambois & Strang Steel hit the nail right on the head as regards closures, I have always excepted that two thirds of all rail closures were justified but of the others some should have stayed open, Oxford-Cambridge, Matlock-Buxton, Carlisle-Edinburgh and even Shanklin-Ventnor to name just a few, the problem was that there was no consideration given to any form of rationalisation of these routes which would have cost money so in the governments mind they had to go.

As regards the broken Blair promise of re-nationalisation of the railways, I think that time may have passed, the only way that can really happen in any form is if the franchise system collapses in upon itself and that certainly could come about. Could end up as a USA form of Amtrack.

[mr B]

the 11th commandment , " thou take'th in one hand and return with the other "

opening of the Dart Valley Rly 21st may 1969 taken over by the South Devon rly Trust in 1992.

mr B

[limitofshunt]

roughly 1000 miles was probably wrong as these included a lot of the more strategic routes which would be on considerable value now, and would have been developed in the mid/late 80s with the Provincial revival.

The benefit of hindsight.... How could that have been predicted 20+ years beforehand?

[Mr Bunt]

This is a debate that could run and run. There is no doubt thst the railway in the 60s was too big and trying to do a lot that it was not suited to. But I suggest that an analysis of the closure 1967 0nwards - roughly 1000 miles was probably wrong as these included a lot of the more strategic routes which would be on considerable value now, and would have been developed in the mid/late 80s with the Provincial revival.

.

Oxford to Cambridge being the real mystery.

The reversal at Bedford may have been a contributory factor, but with dmus that is not a problem. Which leaves only the cost of a revised layout at Sandy as a prohibitive expense which contributed to its demise.

There seems to have been no thought given to future population distribution; even though at the time of that particular closure, plans for a vast urban area called Milton Keynes must have been well advanced.

Lack of "joined up thinking" seems to be a long running problem with UK governments. Look at the following dates:

February 1963: "London - Employment: Housing: Land" published by the Ministry of Housing (allegedly a detailed study of "the growth and movement of the population in the South-East, including overspill from London, and related employment and transport questions")

March 1963: BRB Reshaping Report Published

February 1964: "The South-East Study 1961-1981" published by the Ministry of Housing (and advocating "3 new cities ... in the Southampton/Portsmouth area, the Bletchley area and the Newbury area" - the second of these of course became MK).

Then consider the problems Fred Gibberd had designing Harlow New Town. The first site he was told to look at was partly inside the London Transport Special Area but mainly outside it. That would've made cross town bus routes impossible.

Consequently the proposed site for the new town was moved further west so it was all within the Special Area. Then the MoT decided to move what became the M11 from the western side of Harlow to the eastern one, leaving Gibberd to exclaim "I feel like someone who's designed Brighton then found the sea's been moved"!

Muddle and fudge in British bureaucracy have a long and ignoble history, of which the Oxford-Cambridge line debacle is just a small part.

[mr B]

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mr B

[seacoaler]

The real 'crime' in my view and many others is not keeping the rail pathways clear for possible future reinstatement . However AFAIK this was not in Beechings remit as he was looking at the business case so can't blame him for that .

[cambois]

No That can be laid fairly and squarely at Government and the Civil Service as BRB were required to dispose of surplus land - through legislation.

MoD, NHS, local councils and others did not seem to be under the same scrutiny. There was lot of land I wanted to keep, but it was hard work making sure it was "used", thus not surplus. But there were alsoHQ zealots who sought absolute compliance!

[strang steel]

On a slight tangent to this topic, does anyone know of an internet link to The Stedeford Committee report to the government in the early 1960s?

I realise that it was a confidential report at the time but, after 50 years, I would have thought it might be available in the National Archives. I have tried an internet search, but all I get are references to Beeching and Serpell (who were both on the Stedeford committee); and a mysterious re-direction from one link to a Southampton University web page where I can find no reference to the report at all.

It would be fascinating to read that report, because even the BTC were not supposed to have been allowed to see it at the time, and it may therefore have contained some rather controversial views.


EDITED to say after further delving I have almost answered my own question by discovering there never was a "report", just "recommendations" which are just as difficult to find in the official archives.

[Andy W]

The National Archives appears to have something on it - pieces AN 13/2712 to AN 13/2719 inclusive refer to "the Special Advisory Group" on railways (which Stedeford was the Chairman). There is also a Treasury record reference T 298/185 which seems to have something on it.

I haven't seen these items myself so I don't know what they contain.

[strang steel]

Thanks for the file references Andy. My problem with either visiting to view the documents or having them copied and posted to me, is the expense. They charged me £50 for a recent request for a few family history items, and so I am reluctant to go down that route.

I gather from Backtrack articles that one recommendation was to halt all electrification on cost grounds and possibly complaints about service disruption, hence the placing of electric locos in store in the early 60s. Maybe the ER saw the writing on the wall (as it were) with their order for the Deltics?

[1H was 2E]

.... hence the placing of electric locos in store in the early 60s.

I don't recollect any storage of electric locos in the early 60's. They were all in service, though with only Crewe - Manchester/Liverpool to run on, they weren't highly utilised; it wasn't until about 1967 -68 that the AL3 and AL4 classes were placed in store. This only happened to a particular loco after a major failure but they were chronically unreliable (the diamond shaped works plates on the AL4s being a little clue...) and without them there were still nearly 180 locos for Euston-Manchester-Liverpool.
Many of these crazy-seeming suggestions were made but they generally didn't survive objective analysis. Some have already been touched on, like diverting Midland traffic (coal and passenger) via Mkt Harborough and Northampton to maximise electric traction use, and closing the line between Harboro' and Bedford. Then there was tarmac-ing the GC into Marylebone and replacing all trains (yes, everything) with coaches that left the M1 at Staples Corner and used the GC. Or connections between trains provided by the two trains concerned running alongside each other at the same speed, and a gangway extending between the two to save stopping at stations.
And then a REALLY crazy idea was actually put into practice.....

[mr B]

is this the end ?

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mr b