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Spanish crash

Posted: Thu Jul 25, 2013 8:41 pm
by Bryan

Re: Spanish crash

Posted: Thu Jul 25, 2013 11:48 pm
by silverfox
Very sad,

the video doesn't look promising

Re: Spanish crash

Posted: Sat Jul 27, 2013 11:19 am
by StevieG
Presumably no system such as Virgin's TASS (Tilt Authorisation & Speed Supervision) for its tilting 'Pendolinos' and 'Super Voyagers' was in use as none has been referred to in news reports.
Just possible that the driver* found the train refusing to respond to 'slowing' commands but too distressed/racked with feelings of guilt to have yet referred to it.
- * - Early reports mentioned two drivers?

Still, the equivalent of our OTMR (On Train Monitoring & Reporting), or 'black box' whose existence has been news-reported, will reveal a lot.

Re: Spanish crash

Posted: Sat Jul 27, 2013 2:04 pm
by strang steel
I know that we should not speculate until the facts are made clear, but I find this all very difficult to understand.

I would have thought that in places where the speed limit drops by such a dramatic amount, that even without speed supervision, there ought to be a succession of signals that are permanently at amber (to use the UK parlance). A modern equivalent of a fixed distant, if you like; and later ones that would stay on red until the approaching train was quite close, before changing colour.

I'm sure that many low speed turnouts had this type of signalling in the UK for years and while this was plain track, the principle is the same.

Re: Spanish crash

Posted: Sat Jul 27, 2013 2:46 pm
by 2392
Whilst I can but echo what has already been said about this tragedy. It has brought to my mind an idea of sorts. Bearing in mind that more and more signalling is taking place "in cab" electronically would it not be possible to include some sort of speed limiter, you know the sort of thing fitted to many road vehicles these days. The thinking being that as the "train" knows where it is due to the electronics the program would kick in if the speed was too high approaching a given spot or restriction. Granted there would/should be some sort of audible warning along the lines of those given by the old AWS system used in the UK. My idea would be the driver would be given 3 warnings on the approach and if he/she didn't start to slow down the program would kick in and slow the train.......

Re: Spanish crash

Posted: Sun Jul 28, 2013 12:17 am
by John Palmer
This link to the International Railway Journal website may be of some interest: http://www.railjournal.com/index.php/eu ... train.html

Re: Spanish crash

Posted: Mon Jul 29, 2013 2:03 pm
by StevieG
Before looking into the link provided by John Palmer ;
strang steel wrote: " .... I would have thought that in places where the speed limit drops by such a dramatic amount, that even without speed supervision, there ought to be a succession of signals that are permanently at amber (to use the UK parlance). A modern equivalent of a fixed distant, if you like; and later ones that would stay on red until the approaching train was quite close, before changing colour.
I'm sure that many low speed turnouts had this type of signalling in the UK for years and while this was plain track, the principle is the same. "
IF (big 'if'), things there are anything like standard UK practice (excluding continuous speed supervision, TASS for our tilting trains, and anything like Eurostar 'signalling'/control on HS1 [CTRL]) - Approach release from red for a turnout - YES (we still have hundreds of them) ; - Successions of yellows (strictly, not 'amber') approaching speed reductions on 'straight' (plain) line - NO (except that when signalled as a running move [not sidings] on a route taking a train onto a buffer stop, the buffer at the end of that line is regarded as equivalent to a signal at red [normally has a red light(s0 anyway], and the preceding signal(s) show yellow(s) accordingly; otherwise, No); - we rely on drivers' knowledge of 'the road', their whereabouts, and the applicable permanent speed reductions, also sight of the signs at changes of permissible speed/turnouts, which are part of the certified competence of 'knowing' a route. But this is also supported by an advanced permissible speed warning sign ('Morpeth board') and permanent AWS caution indication in cab at a calculated distance before reaching a point where speed must be reduced from the previous speed limit by a third or more; Plus nowadays, on most important routes, TPWS (Train Protection and Warning System) equipment has been fitted, and this includes overspeed sensors to detect a train approaching such a speed reduction point faster than a pre-calculated safe speed, and will cause an automatic on-board brake demand and bring the train to a stand.