Norton on Tees Incident

[52A]

http://www.raib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cf ... n_Tees.pdf

[Mickey]

Without sounding to critical i learnt all about 'basic signalling' practice i.e. such as what is a home signal & what is a distant signal when i was 11 years old back in 1968 from the Ian Allan book called British Railway signalling vol.2 re-published in 1968 (originally published in 1963 i believe?).

It makes you wonder how some of these driver's of today would have got on back in the late 1960s & early 1970s when there was a mixture of semaphore & colour light signalling all the way between Kings Cross & Edinburgh?.

[John Palmer]

Yes, 1st edition published in 1963. Well worth the 7/6 I paid for it.

It is worrying that the driver is reported to have recognised that the stop signal in question was exhibiting a red aspect yet 'did not realise he had passed signal NW36 at danger.'

I am also surprised that the man at Norton-on-Tees South assumed he had previously accepted the overrunning train and treated West’s attempt to send 4-5-5 as Train Entering Section.

[watcheronthebridge]

The report makes the point that as the number of semaphore signals dwindle so drivers becomes less familiar with them, particularly in darkness as in this case where there was a brighter amber light with a less bright red light above it. AWS/TPWS would have made a difference here, but I note from the report that this particular signal was not so equipped. The reason for this was "...TPWS equipment is not required where the only potential for collision is with
the rear of another train, on the same track, travelling in the same direction..." but historically wouldn't the vast majority of train accidents fall into this category? For instance the accident on the LNER at Castlecary in 1937.

[Andy W]

The main worry I had with this incident was that if there had been something ahead the driver would not have realised until he was virtually on top of it. Granted there is a bit of an issue about unfamilarity here but you build that into the training so you do get staff to think "that's unusual - safety first". Incidentally, "The Signal Box" website is the training aid of choice these days for several TOCs teaching drivers about semaphores, but not with the TOC concerned in this incident I believe.

The bit about the unauthorised bell signal shows the value of having specific box instructions for a regular operational situation rather than letting the signalmen make it up for themselves.

[StevieG]

" .... Incidentally, "The Signal Box" website is the training aid of choice these days for several TOCs teaching drivers about semaphores, .... "

Agreed Andy.
Also as a training aid, I find the site
http://www.railsigns.co.uk
very good for finding out about railway signs and signals past and present, though only in terms of pictorial examples rather than giving comprehensive explanations.

[Mickey]

The bit about the unauthorised bell signal shows the value of having specific box instructions for a regular operational situation rather than letting the signalmen make it up for themselves.

I may well be completely wrong here but the issue about the "non-standard bell signal" could be a substitue bell signal that was being used by all the signalmen for the Train approaching bell code (Train approaching 1-2-1 where authorised) to give signalmen mainly at level crossing s/boxes where authorised an extra warning of an approaching train from the next s/box in the rear so as to give the signalman at the level crossing box time to close the gates or barriers and clear there signals, maybe this particular bell code WASN'T authoriesd at that box for whatever reason and the signalmen down the years had adopted there "own" Train approaching bell signal?. I don't really see what bearing it has on a driver who has SPAD a home signal to be honest??.

I recall travelling along the West London line as a secondman in 1979 and at Kensington north main s/box ALL the semaphore oil lamps were out on the north box gantry which also carried Kensington south main's distant signals as well (maybe 6 or 7 semaphore arms including subsidary miniture arms as well in total) the thing was in 'total darkness' on the approach to Kensington Olympia station from the north also most of the ground disc-signals at Kensington north main were also out as well plus several semaphores at Kensington south main.

In fact it was quite a 'normal' happening on the West London line back in the 1970s to have many of the main running signals and ground disc-signals between Latchmere Junction s/box (near Clapham Junction) and Mitre Bridge Junction s/box L.N.W.R. (Willesden) which included Chelsea & Fulham s/box, Kensington south & north main s/boxes and North Pole Junction s/box to find that all or most of there signals at those s/boxes were out at night believe it or not.

Kensington south main s/box lamps were usually ok but Kensington north main s/box lamps were virtually always out at night.

[Mickey]

Yes, 1st edition published in 1963. Well worth the 7/6 I paid for it.

Probably the best 15/-(i think it was 15 bob in 1968?) that i ever spent on a railway book.

British Rail would have been wise to have adopted this book as a standard work on signalling and issued it to all new signalmen, it dealt with virtually everything you needed to know as a signalman in a very readable form from a brief history of railway signalling to block regulations to block bells to lever colours and as a 11 year old at the time when i bought the book in 1968 it gave me a very good grounding in signalling so when i went into it in the early 1970s it was just like coming home to an old friend.

I believe this book has been up dated and re-published several times by Ian Allan since 1968 and now incorporates all the modern forms of signalling.

[Andy W]

The unauthorised (train approaching) bell signal has been established (elsewhere) as one beat. This led to the confusion at South as to whether he had in fact accepted the train from West and he then cleared his signals. If he hadn't had received the bell signal a train suddenly turning up there would have, in all probability, been held there and not sent on. That is why the signal is relevant - it is a concern additional and separate to the actual cause of the incident.

The whole set up there cries out for a proper authorised way of dealing with the approaching train situation and not putting all the pressure on the local bobbies.

[Mickey]

The unauthorised (train approaching) bell signal has been established (elsewhere) as one beat. This led to the confusion at South as to whether he had in fact accepted the train from West and he then cleared his signals. If he hadn't had received the bell signal a train suddenly turning up there would have, in all probability, been held there and not sent on. That is why the signal is relevant - it is a concern additional and separate to the actual cause of the incident.

The whole set up there cries out for a proper authorised way of dealing with the approaching train situation and not putting all the pressure on the local bobbies.

I only read through briefly some of the report, so they were using 'one on the block bell' as a way of warning the next box of a train approaching because the official Train approaching block bell (1-2-1 where authorised) hadn't obviously been authorised between those two s/boxes?.

Personally i would have thought that using 'one on the block bell' (official 'call attention' bell code) would have been a wee bit confusing cos i would have always been thinking that the other box 'had company' (a manager in the box?) and was offering on a train as per the official block regulations on Absolute block but there you go?.

[John Palmer]

I think it's going too far to say that if the man at South had not received the unofficial bell signal the train would, in all probability, have been held. The report puts the potential relevance of the unofficial signal in the following terms:

'33. One possible explanation for the Norton-on-Tees South signaller's confusion was the use of the non-standard bell-code by the signaller at Norton-on-Tees West (paragraph 11). If the signaller at Norton-on-Tees South was not aware that train 1A60 was expected, it is unlikely that he would have had any reason to assume that he had made a mistake when he received the bell-code that was sent by the signaller at Norton-on-Tees West after train 1A60 had passed signal NW36 at danger.' (emphasis added)

Consider the alternatives if West offers 1A60 on as soon as he receives TES from Ferryhill. If South accepts then West can clear his signals and no SPAD occurs. However, immediate acceptance by South implies that there can be no conflicting movements over the Sunderland-Northallerton route past South box for the minimum period of 15 minutes the train will be occupying the Ferryhill-Norton West section. So South may well decline West's offer. In that case West keeps his signals at danger, but South has now become aware that a train from West is expected, as per Para. 33 quoted above. In such circumstances South might equally well wonder whether he had, in fact, accepted the overunning train when it appears unexpectedly, rather than having declined it as he did.

[Andy W]

Yes, I take your point, especially as he doesn't seem to have realised what his instruments were telling him. Your scenario is all too plausible and my use of "in all probability" was far too strong.

[PinzaC55]

This bit
"The driver involved was experienced, having worked for a freight train
operator for six years before joining Grand Central Railway. Although it had not
been responsible for his original training, Grand Central Railway had assessed
the driver’s competence in semaphore signalling, but had not identified that he
did not fully understand the meaning of the configuration that he encountered on
2 December 2009."
is particularly amazing in that a driver with 6 years previous experience didn't understand a common signal configuration.

[Mickey]

This bit
"The driver involved was experienced, having worked for a freight train
operator for six years before joining Grand Central Railway. Although it had not
been responsible for his original training, Grand Central Railway had assessed
the driver’s competence in semaphore signalling, but had not identified that he
did not fully understand the meaning of the configuration that he encountered on
2 December 2009."
is particularly amazing in that a driver with 6 years previous experience didn't understand a common signal configuration.

It is and it isn't PinzaC55, considering in British Rail days of the 1970s ALL driver's started as secondmen and had to at the very least 2 years as a secondman before they could go up for driving and that was the exception most secondmen would do 5 or 6 as a secondman before they went up for driving and even then after passing there rules & regs and going on a traction training course at Ilford to learn various traction units such as class 08 diesel shunters and class 31s they would only be a 'passed secondman' and would probably only get light engine movements, yard shunting and maybe ECS diagrams for there first year out as a driver until they were promoted into the lower driver's links.

Nowadays they take people 'off the street' (same in the signalling grade) put them through driving course and after a certain number of months they are out driving!. Sometimes the old ways of doing it was better me thinks.

[Andy W]

I have no problem with "boil in the bags", as we older time served railwaymen sometimes call them, but I do have an issue with assessments that are tick box exercises, particularly when semaphores, in certain circumstances, become unfamiliar to those more used to driving in colour light areas and certain problems may well arise as a result of that unfamiliarity. That is where a properly tailored assessment regime comes in so you can test them on these situations as well as continually ingraining the safety first culture that our block signalling system is based on.

You or I might immediately know what we are looking at but this driver got confused on a very basic point. My view is this should have been picked up before it became an issue on the road.